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Abstract
In this paper we address some of the stability issues raised by the European life insurance regula-
tion valuation scheme. Via an in-depth study of the so-called economic valuation framework, shaped
through the market-consistency contract we first point out the practical interest of one of the El Karoui,
Loisel, Prigent & Vedani (2017) propositions to enforce the stability of the cut-off dates used as inputs
to calibrate actuarial models. This led us to delegitimize the argument of the no-arbitrage opportunity as
a regulatory criteria to frame the valuation, and as an opposition to the previously presented approach.
Then we display tools to improve the convergence of the economic value estimations be it the V IF or
the SCR, using usual variance reduction methods and a specific work on the simulation seeds. Through
various implementations on a specific portfolio and valuation model we decrease the variance of the
estimators by over 16 times.
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Introduction
Dating back to the the late 1990s and 2000s,the European Commission began creating a path to en-
force the insurance European market in a direction ensuring more protection for the consumer thanks
to common and harmonised rules to characterise the solvency of a firm (Solvency I then Solvency II
Directives).
The regulatory framework considered consumer protection, based on market and commercial prac-
tices. This objective led to one of the two sides of the harmonisation. This article deals with the other
side, the implications of defining a common framework for the economic/regulatory capital, which is the
main ingredient to explicit the notion of solvency.
Solvency II being risk-based, the need for a comparable measure of the different exposures, be it on
the asset or liability sides, led naturally to the concept of ”fair value” which was developed in a parallel
path (see in particular The´rond (2016) and chapter 2 of Laurent et al. (2016)). Indeed, since the seven-
ties, the notion of ”Market price” has been used and refined especially in areas where a transparent and
fair trading price is known. For this notion to be adapted to more complex situations, especially when
financial options are involved, maiden theoretical works (Black & Scholes (1973), Merton (1973)...) de-
veloped the risk-neutral valuation principles framework allowing for those calculations. The accountant
community also developed notions voluntarily in line through the definition of ”fair value measurement”
(see International Accounting Standards Board (2011)).
In practice, though estimating the value of an asset, especially if it is listed, is quite straightforward,
it is not the case for insurance companies’ liability side.Since life insurance contracts are not exchanged,
assigning a fair price to them involves a complex model and its cash flows’ projection, even in the
Standard Formula case.
This complexity and the regulatory necessity to use economic scenarios on the one hand and, on the
other hand, assess regulatory valuations through Monte-Carlo estimations, renders the stability of inputs
and the convergence character essential for its use as an efficient tool to quantify solvency and ease the
work of European control authorities. These are the two main lines of this paper.
In Section 1 we review briefly the different historical and regulatory aspects which led to the Sol-
vency II characteristics highlighting those with material impact on the market-(in)consistency. Through
this Section we underline its need for more stability. Finally we focus on one approach developed in
El Karoui et al. (2017) to improve the stability of economic scenarios calibration inputs and lower the
manipulability of the current practical scheme. But this method is often opposed by the no-arbitrage
opportunity condition, a regulatory requirement for these valuation. This led us to recall this condition
basics, operational requirements, and finally to show its incompatibility with the life insurance regula-
tion in Section 2. According to the authors, these developments promote the real practical interest of the
aforementioned approach.
In Section 3 we consider the convergence issue for the regulatory estimators. We present and imple-
ment some practitioners-oriented approaches to improve their various estimations, of Values of In-Force
and Solvency Capital Requirements. In Section 4 we finally propose and implement an aggregated ap-
proach (still relatively easy to implement forpractitioners) which has led us to improve Value of In-Force
estimation by more than 16×.
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1 Market-consistent life insurance valuation in Solvency II - stability is-
sues and first proposition
Mixing fair-value and regulatory valuation led the regulator (through the Solvency II directive - Euro-
pean Commission (2009)) to develop an insurance-adjusted valuation scheme based on financial market
practices, the so-called market-consistency.
1.1 Market-consistency: financial stability and accounting information comparability
With Solvency II, the European Commission desired to reinforce the European insurance market so that
solvency appreciation is made comparable across Europe, ensuring both a level playing field for the com-
panies and the same consumer protection for the insureds and/or policyholders. In this regard, one of
the biggest challenges was to ensure a comparable prudential balance sheet template could be populated
across Europe notwithstanding the different national accounting norms. However, despite this objective
to increase the level of harmonisation, the reserving mechanisms which are driving the estimation of tech-
nical provisions still largely depend on country-specific ”Solvency I”-GAAP norms. Indeed as all taxes
and social contributions are generally based on those national accounting norms, the historical/booking
value of assets and liabilities then play the same role as in the Solvency I framework. Therefore, compar-
ing the different values for technical provisions can be quite challenging for the insureds or supervisory
authority throughout the whole EU market.
In parallel with the development of solvency directives, the notion of ”Fair value” emerged through
the discussion at the International Accounting standards Board (IASB) as a way to tackle those compa-
rability issues. In a nutshell, fair value can be characterised in three points (see The´rond (2016)):
1. Level 1: the price of the products is directly listed in an active market
2. Level 2: Parameters or prices can be inferred via a model (such as a financial option, and the
implied volatility (IV) of the underlying asset) (”Mark to Market”)
3. Level 3: The price is inferred from a model where interactions are necessary to estimate the figure
as a consequence of the model (”Mark to Model”)
Even if liabilities can actually be exchanged between insurance companies, this does not happen
quite often and, even worse, there are no listed market for these trades, be it indexes or reporting of the
effective transaction value. The only possible choice of the exposed alternative is the level 3: estimating
the value of those via a probability-weighted average of future cash-flows, discounted with a Risk-Free
Rate as outlined in the article 77 of European Commission (2009). With such a procedure, at least on
a theoretical point of view, all technical provisions are made comparable independently of any national
insurance sector’s characteristics. As a consequence, the solvency appreciation with respect to own funds
and solvency of any EU insurance company is done on the same terms.
However, experts are now backing up from fair valuation because of its inherent procyclicality. De-
spite the merits regarding comparability, this valuation methods tends to minimise the value of liabilities
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when markets are bullish and over-estimate them in times of crisis. (see Laux & Leuz (2009), Laux &
Leuz (2010), Plantin et al. (2008a) and Plantin et al. (2008b)).
1.2 Insurance market-consistency - from regulations to practice
Since the only available technique to evaluate liabilities is the mark to model one, an insurance company
needs to describe its asset-liabilities management strategy for which the following are needed:
1. a unique risk-free rate spot curve;
2. a methodology to produce future cash flows reflecting unequivocally the policyholders’ behaviour;
3. economic scenarios deriving from the initial risk-free rate describing the future evolution of the
assets;
4. a set of rules defining the interactions between the scenarios’ tables and the policies to browse each
sample path’s scenario to ultimately produce cash flows out of any policy.
The only intrinsic part of this process is the determination of the risk-free rate spot curve. The
regulatory framework from the Directive to the ITS define what is the basic risk-free interest rate term
structure According to Article 77a of the Solvency II Directive the relevant risk-free interest rate term
structure should be based on relevant financial instruments traded in deep, liquid and transparent (DLT)
markets. This provision is further specified in recital 21, Article 1(32), (33) and (34), and Articles 43,
44 and 46 of the Delegated Regulation European Commission (2015b). The identification of the relevant
financial instruments is based on this DLT assessment which is a list, for each currency, of the maturities
for which the market of the relevant financial instrument is considered DLT including the identification of
the last maturity for which rates can be observed in DLT markets (section 7.B refers to the determination
of the Last Liquid Point (LLP)). On top of those elements, the determination of the Ultimate Forward
Rate (UFR), recently provided by EIOPA1 is key. Indeed, EIOPA provides the EU insurance market a
basic risk-free rate (RFR) curve which goes up to 150 years, thanks to interpolation from the LLP to the
60th year for Euro, via Smith Wilson extrapolation and interpolation.
To go from the basic RFR to the one used for calculation, one needs to add the effect of the Credit
Risk Adjustment on the one hand and, on the other hand all the relevant Long Term Guarantee package
items which can distort the produced interest rate curve such as the volatility adjustment (VA) or the
Matching Adjustment (MA). Only with all such information taken into account, insurance companies
or their information providers will set up their calibration process to produce their scenario tables. The
potential large variation only due to calibration does induce great sensitivity to the final value of both
BEL and own funds. This illustrates the principle from The´rond (2016) ”one fair value principle, several
valuation techniques”
1The specifications for the determination of the UFR’s level have been released in 2017 (”EIOPA-BoS-17/072”) and can
be retrieved on EIOPA’s website: https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/Specification%20of%20the%
20methodology%20to%20derive%20the%20UFR.pdf
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1.3 A first proposition for deeper calibration data stability
From most operational practices, the main issue (though not only) of the valuation scheme is the fact most
insurance companies use different calibration inputs for their model. This leads to both an instability of
valuations in space (the space of potential inputs at a fixed date) and in time (linked to the high volatility
of these market inputs). A particular aspect of these problems is linked to the end-of-year regulatory
valuation date. This date is the accounting closure date for most listed companies and the financial
markets undergo numerous trades for the sake of accounting optimisation. In particular, this leads to
irrational market changes (”turn-of the year effect”, well-known by traders, see e.g. Ritter (1988)), and
it is very hazardous to pick market data up during this period being asset prices or other IV. In addition,
having the life insurance whole market regulation depend on one single date renders easier possible
manipulations (even the Libor rate can be more or less manipulated, see in particular Abrantes-Metz
et al. (2012)).
For such reasons we have focused on a specific tool proposed by El Karoui et al. (2017) to improve
the fairness of prices obtained through insurance regulation valuations, decrease the manipulability of
the scheme and add some stability through inertia to the interest rates models calibration data: the use of
monthly-averaged IV matrices for calibration.
In subsection 2.2.3 of their paper, El Karoui et al. shape an adapted market-consistent constraint for
interest rate models calibration (under the RFR yield curve) on different swaption log-normal IV matri-
ces, in particular averaged matrices so as to insert inertia in calibration data (lower time-dependency).
• The IV averaged on the whole month of October 2017. Only the receiver swaptions of maturity 5,
tenors 1 to 10, and the receiver swaptions of tenor 5, maturities 1 to 10.
• The IV averaged on the whole two months of October and November 2014. Only the receiver
swaptions of maturity 5, tenors 1 to 10, and the receiver swaptions of tenor 5, maturities 1 to 10.
• The IV as of end-of-year 2014. Only the receiver swaptions of maturity 10, tenors 1 to 10, and the
receiver swaptions of tenor 10, maturities 1 to 10 (v2).
• And the IV as of end-of-year 2014. Only the receiver swaptions of maturity 5, tenors 1 to 10, and
the receiver swaptions of tenor 5, maturities 1 to 10 (v2).
The four calibrated then simulated tables embed 1,000 economic scenarios without any use of vari-
ance reduction techniques, obtained from the same simulation seed. The interest rates model considered
is a Libor Market Model, often used by French practitioners at that time. They are used to valuate three
standard saving products2 economic own funds3. Results are summarized in table 1.
This implementation has shown the high volatility of European economic valuation scheme. One
can see a gap of about 140% between the end-of-year v1 calibration and the October 14’ averaged IV
calibration for portfolio 1. This is a clear example of the locality in space and time of market-consistency.
2See the paper for more information about the portfolios tested.
3The economic own funds valuation presents the same issues as for the economic liabilities Best Estimate as the market
value of the Asset part in the economic balance sheet is obvious.
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Table 1: Comparison between the obtained economic own funds values - 2014 results
October 14’ Oct. & Nov. 14’ 12/31/14 v1 12/31/14 v2
portfolio 1 16,898 15,614 7,046 10,000
portfolio 2 12,826 12,283 9,517 10,000
portfolio 3 12,553 12,073 6,050 10,000
2 Insurance market-consistency and the no-arbitrage condition
The El Karoui et al. (2017) proposition to improve the stability of market data used for insurance interest
rates models calibration is often questioned by practitioners, in particular due to its non-respect of the
no-arbitrage opportunity condition. Indeed, the averaged volatility matrices do not fit the yield curve
date (end-of-year) which a priori leads to market prices arbitrage opportunities. In this Section we have
chosen to demystify the no-arbitrage opportunity assumption, in particular as soon as the life insurance
economic valuation is considered. After a short recall of the theoretical basics of this assumption, we
focus on its various implications on financial market practices to better underline its non-adaptability to
the insurance market. This leads us to show the limits of some regulation requirements and finally to
refute the legitimacy of this counter-argument to the El Karoui et al. proposition.
2.1 Short reminder on risk-neutral theory and the no-arbitrage condition
Here we quickly recall the historical developments and underlying assumptions below the no-arbitrage
principle.
Arrow and Debreu (see Debreu (1987), Arrow (1964) and Arrow & Debreu (1954)) determine the
optimal probability measure to balance prices in dynamic arbitrage-free markets. Their work offered a
solution to the set of supply/demand equations from the seminal Walras (1896) which first led to the idea
of optimal price on an economy where all supply and demand act rationally, under perfect competition.
In parallel to the economic theory, the mathematical finance theory evolved from Bachelier (1900),
to shape the conditions for the existence and unicity of a risk-neutral probability. It exists under the
no-arbitrage condition (it is an equivalence) and is unique if the market is complete (all derivatives can
be replicated by a linear strategy of simple assets).
Under these simple axioms, Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) develop risk-neutral models
to formalise the stocks evolution (Geometric Brownian) and derivative prices at all time. Then many
different models are developed for all sorts of financial assets (see Brigo & Mercurio (2006), Cont
(2004),...).
The no-arbitrage condition induces the non-existence of any 0-cost market strategy that ensures a
strictly positive gain. Nobel price Milton Friedman talked of no free lunch. Under the complete mar-
ket assumption, the risk-neutral measure is the only valuation probability measure that ensures the no-
arbitrage condition.
In practice, it is highly important to keep in mind that any use of a risk-neutral model for pricing (e.g.
a derivative) assumes the valuated asset is well hedged (through market completeness) and only supports
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a risk purely associated to its underlyings and not to the general market. This is why the risk-neutral
models only focus on underlying’s volatilities and assume a risk-free averaged evolution of all assets.
Out of this scheme the risk-neutral valuation has no reality. It is (for example) not used in corporate
finance and for banking investment strategies, but only for derivative pricing. 4
2.2 The no-arbitrage condition in financial markets vs. in Solvency II
2.2.1 A financial market prerequisite
In practice every financial market presents limited arbitrage opportunities at all times. These are limited
and quickly cancelled as soon as the market is liquid enough. Indeed, if enough buyers and sellers are
active, well-informed and logical, perfect competition is close and, as the number of financial agreements
rises, the situation converges towards fair prices and arbitrage reduction.
This is an essential point to ensure the confidence of investors and of the market. On the 23 April
2013, after a fake tweet of Associated Press announcing two explosions in the White House, a quick
arbitrage opportunity occurred in the Dow Jones. The index decreases by 1% but two minutes later
recovers to its initial level (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Arbitrage Opportunity in the Dow Jones - 04/23/13 (source : The Telegraph)
Such an issue in the transparency of information barely happens, in particular on such a liquid market.
And the fast recovery, almost exact, eases investors concerning the index fair price. The no-arbitrage
condition is an absolute prerequisite to efficient market deals and financial markets well-being.
4This is one of the major theoretical issue for its use in life insurance liabilities valuation, tools that are simply neither sold
on complete markets nor hedgeable / hedged.
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2.2.2 An insurance regulator requirement
From the Official Journal of the European Union volume 58 (2015) supplementing directive Solvency II,
some straightforward notification
SECTION 3.1 - Methodologies to calculate technical provisions - Assumptions underlying the cal-
culation of technical provisions - Article 22 (General provisions) paragraph 3 (European Commission
(2015a)),
Insurance and reinsurance undertakings shall set assumptions on future financial market
parameters or scenarios that are appropriate and consistent with Article 75 of Directive
2009/138/EC. Where insurance and reinsurance undertakings use a model to produce pro-
jections of future financial market parameters, it shall comply with all of the following re-
quirements:
a it generates asset prices that are consistent with asset prices observed in financial mar-
kets;
b it assumes no-arbitrage opportunity;
c the calibration of the parameters and scenarios is consistent with the relevant risk-free
interest rate term structure used to calculate the best estimate as referred to in Article
77(2) of Directive 2009/138/EC. [Solvency II]
The consistency with the relevant risk-free interest rate term structure for both calibration and sim-
ulation is fixed and verified in practice but the consistency with market prices is not clear, apart when
considering that in fact the texts means IV. However, the second condition needs further discussions at
this stage of our presentation.
2.3 The no-arbitrage condition implications for the insurance market
As soon as a different yield curve but similar market IV are considered, new option prices are deduced
and there exist arbitrage opportunities with financial markets, see Figure 2 below, for such differences in
swaption prices as of end-of-year 2017.
At first, one could assume the insurance regulator does not mean comparing finance and insurance
markets prices in its view of ”no-arbitrage opportunity” in practice. Another possibility is that it only
considers no-arbitrage on the (at least European) insurance market. But in practice there are still many
arbitrages, such as for example, the swaption prices assessed using the European companies economic
scenarios tables. Such options are used to calibrate the stochastic interest rates models which should lead
to similar prices when simulating, but the maturities/tenors used to calibrate are not fixed by the regulator
so that there exist many discrepancies among companies’ choices even in the same country. In addition,
different models and different calibration algorithms are used, leading to different market option prices
and therefore arbitrage opportunities directly embedded in the various companies economic scenarios
tables.
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Figure 2: EIOPA swaption prices with the regulatory RFR yield curve vs. true prices (using the Euroswap
yield curve) - matrix 20y×20y as at end-of-year 2017
In fact the only possibility to apply comparability of prices on the insurance economic values market
would be to force the companies to use the same economic scenarios table.
Even if it were possible, actuaries are dealing with a market on which no one buys or sells products.
In this context, prices obtained are never submitted to the supply and demand criteria and, unlike liquid
financial markets, cannot converge towards fair prices.
Finally it must be admitted that the no-arbitrage condition has not the same implications here as
for financial markets and practices. The ”no-arbitrage opportunity” condition only states a valuation
scheme where some market data and regulation choices are mixed to display more or less homogeneously
obtained values. The fact this condition cannot be implemented for the insurance market should not be
used as an excuse to legitimize insurance sector’s practices.
These conclusions do not invalidate the insurance valuation scheme entirely, but aim at partly discon-
necting its current implementation from the theoretical and practical financial market. This last frame-
work is very complex and must be wisely balanced and understood when used as a theoretical and
practical justification for insurance solvency regulation choices.
3 Economic valuation stability through estimators convergence accelera-
tion
Every economic valuation requires economic scenarios tables (see El Karoui et al. (2017) for more
insights about economic valuation methodology and Vedani & Devineau (2013) for its practical standard
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and approximated implementation approaches). The practical methods to assess all type of values (be
it asset, liability best estimate or own funds) are very similar. For this reason we focus our discussion
on economic own funds (or Net Asset Values) and more precisely on the Value of In-Force (V IF), that
is the part of own funds (OF = V IF +RNA [the Revalued Net Asset]) obtained through Monte-Carlo
estimation of the averaged Net Present Value of future margins cash-flows (denoted by NPV below).
3.1 Monte-Carlo estimators convergence - a general issue in the Solvency II directive
One economic scenario leads to one valuation of NPV . If one considers an economic scenarios table of
S scenarios one obtains a Monte-Carlo estimator of the V IF through,
V̂ IF = 1S ∑
S
s=1 NPV
s.
The Monte Carlo estimators convergence results from the Law of Large Numbers, without any ad-
ditional model specification assumption. But the main issue with every Monte-Carlo valuation approach
is its time complexity. The higher the variance of the underlying variable (NPV here), the higher the
number of scenarios needed to provide an efficient estimator convergence.
V IF estimation therefore requires a high number of economic scenarios and corresponding NPV
assessment (because the NPV variable has in general a very high variance). This is easily seen through
the 0 < p < 100% asymptotic confidence interval that can be estimated for the V̂ IF estimator,
CIp
(
V̂ IF
)
=
[
V̂ IF±
√
Vˆ[NPV ]q 1+p
2
[N (0,1)]
√
S
]
,
with the usual unbiased variance estimator,
Vˆ [NPV ] = 1(S−1) ∑
S
s=1
(
NPV s−V̂ IF
)2
.
To increase the estimator convergence speed (and decrease the confidence interval length), it is pos-
sible to increase S but it is also possible to try to decrease the variance of the variable of interest, NPV
here. We present two possibilities to do so in subsection 3.2.
In reality two different estimators are of great importance concerning the Solvency II regulation.
Along with the V IF estimator, the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) denotes the regulatory capital.
According to the regulation the latter must be assessed at least every end-of-year and it can be calculated
through two different approaches, Internal Model or Standard Formula (see in particular Devineau &
Loisel (2009) which depicts the way both are theoretically implemented and the assumptions under
which both approaches converge). In this paper we focus on the standard formula approach, which is the
most widespread estimation method used.
This approach relies on the estimation of marginal risk capitals (stock risk, interest rates risk, longevity
risk, lapse risk etc.), assessed as the difference between the standard (central) economic own funds
and the marginally (instantaneously) shocked own funds. Assuming there exist I different shocks, any
marginal SCR (denoted by SCRi,∀i ∈ (risk1, ...,riskI)) is obtained as,
SCRi = OF −OFi = V IF −V IFi with OFi (respectively V IFi) the i-marginally shocked own fund
(respectively V IF),
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estimated by,
ŜCRi = V̂ IF−V̂ IF i.
These estimated sub-capitals are then aggregated through an elliptic approach in order to assess ŜCR,
the estimated standard formula SCR.5
In subsection 3.3 we address the estimator ŜCRi convergence issue and focus on a specific method-
ological aspect, important to respect, that enables a quicker convergence of the estimated sub-capitals
and finally of the estimated standard formula SCR (see Appendix 1).
3.2 VIF estimator convergence - variance reduction methods
Two different easy techniques can be used to decrease the NPV variance and increase the V IF estimator
convergence. One of these approaches is often well-known and used by actuarial practitioners, the an-
tithetic variables. But the second one is as easy to implement, generally very efficient, though not used
by practitioners, namely control variate. It is very important to note that these two techniques can be
implemented together to improve the convergence even more.
3.2.1 Antithetic variables
The antithetic variables (AV) methodology is a well-known variance reduction approach, often used in
finance and simulation theory in general (see e.g. Paskov & Traub (1995) or Glasserman (2004)).
The idea behind most variance reduction techniques as is the case here is to speed up the Monte
Carlo estimation of the interest variable average by considering an alternative variable with same mean
but lower variance.
In practice each economic scenario can be summarised by a set of random standard Gaussian out-
comes, those used to simulate its underlying economic variables (stock indexes, yield curves, spreads,...).
Let ε be this sample of outcomes so that one can see any valuated NPV as a closed function of ε , which
we simply note below (when necessary) NPV (ε).
One finally estimates, with evident notations (using NPV (εs) instead of NPV s),
V̂ IF = 1S ∑
S
s=1 NPV (εs).
The application of antithetic variables to V IF estimation consists in considering S even (S = 2N be-
low), and, denoting by (εs)s∈J1;NK the N first scenarios random outcomes vectors, in using (εs =−εs−N)
∀s ∈ JN+1;SK for the N last scenarios random outcomes vectors.
In practice, all conditions sum up to CoVar [NPV (ε);NPV (−ε)] ≤ 0 be always verified whichever
asset-liability management (ALM) model or economic conditions are considered. This leads to,
V
[
V̂ IF
AV]
= V
[ 1
S ∑
S
s=1 NPV (εs)
]
= V
[ 1
S ∑
N
s=1 NPV (εs)+NPV (−εs)
]
5In reality the full aggregated SCR is a bit more complex but we chose to focus on an elliptic aggregation for the sake of
simplicity.
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= 12SV [NPV (ε)+NPV (−ε)]
= 12S (V [NPV (ε)]+V[NPV (−ε)]+2CoVar [NPV (ε);NPV (−ε)])
≤ 12S (V [NPV (ε)]+V [NPV (−ε)]),
and, as V [NPV (ε)] = V [NPV (−ε)](recall ε is a standard Gaussian outcomes vector),
V
[
V̂ IF
AV]≤ 1S (V [NPV (ε)]) = V[ 1S ∑Ss=1 NPV (εs)]= V[V̂ IF].
Finally the variance of the AV-V IF estimator is lower than the one of a standard V IF estimator,
that would have been estimated using S independent random outcomes vectors (S independent economic
scenarios). This justifies the use of antithetic variables as a V IF estimator variance reduction. The AV
estimator converges faster (and, in particular, the confidence interval length decreases).
3.2.2 Control variate
Control variate (CV) is another variance reduction methodology, also very well-known in finance and
simulation theory (see e.g. Hull & White (1988) or again Glasserman (2004)), that can be easily adapted
to our methodology.
The underlying idea of CV is to find a variable Y , also function of ε , whose exact average is known
and which satisfies CoVar [NPV (ε);Y (ε)] 6= 0.
In practice such variables are easy to find for insurance NPV . The NPV are highly linked to the
movements of the economic variables embedded within the economic scenarios their calculation relies
on. Finally, one can select a portfolio of assets which cash-flows are highly correlated to the net present
values of margin cash-flows. If these assets are not too complex, their true expectancy at t = 0 (their
prices) is straightforward and finally the portfolio true averaged value at t = 0 is known. In this example
Y is the portfolio net present value of future cash flows, which fully depends on the considered economic
scenarios and therefore on its ε vector. This type of portfolio variable, highly correlated with the in-
surance NPV has already been investigated and is the base of the replicating portfolio theory (see e.g.
Schrager (2008), Devineau & Chauvigny (2011), Pelsser & Schweizer (2016)).
The implementation of CV still relies on the use of an alternative variable of interest. Instead of
NPV (ε), the practitioner may use a variable with the same average but a lower variance, the CV-NPV (ε),
denoted by NPVCV (ε) and defined as,
NPVCV (ε) = NPV (ε)+ c(Y (ε)−E [Y (ε)]),
with c a constant. One verifies,
{
E [NPV (ε)+ c(Y (ε)−E [Y (ε)])] = E [NPV (ε)] =V IF , and,
V [NPV (ε)+ c(Y (ε)−E [Y (ε)])] = V [NPV (ε)]+ c2V [Y (ε)]+2c.CoVar [NPV (ε);Y (ε)] .
And if c is chosen to minimise the variance, that is, c∗ =−CoVar[NPV (ε);Y (ε)]V[Y (ε)] one verifies that,
V [NPV (ε)+ c∗ (Y (ε)−E [Y (ε)])]≤ V [NPV (ε)] (obtained for c = 0).
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Finally we obtain,
V
[
V̂ IF
CV]
= V
[ 1
S ∑
S
s=1 NPV
CV (εs)
]
= 1SV
[
NPVCV (ε)
]≤ 1SV [NPV (ε)] = V[V̂ IF].
This justifies the use of control variate as a V IF estimator variance reduction. The CV estimator
converges faster (and the confidence interval length decreases).
As a matter of fact, if CoVar [NPV (ε);Y (ε)] = 0 then c∗ = 0 and NPV (εs)CV = NPV (εs), the CV
has no impact. In opposition, if NPV (ε) and Y (ε) are collinear/antilinear, then E
[
V̂ IF
]
is known up to
a multiplicative coefficient
(
E
[
V̂ IF
]
=±
√
V[NPV (ε)]
V[Y (ε)] E [Y (ε)]
)
.
Besides, in all generality Correl [NPV (ε);Y (ε)] ∈ ]−1;0[∪ ]0;1[, and CV users aim to get Y such as
this correlation is the closest to -1 or 1.
Once again, note that AV and CV can totally be implemented at the same time without full cannibal-
isation of their positive effects. The final AV+CV V IF estimator converges even faster.
3.3 Standard Formula SCR convergence - the simulation seed importance
In this subsection we address the standard formula SCR estimator convergence issue. We focus here on
one single sub-risk SCR estimator but the point raised can be applied to all marginal SCR estimator, so
that the final SCR estimator variance should decrease (see Appendix 1).
Recall the shape of our marginal SCR estimator associated to shock i,
ŜCRi = V̂ IF−V̂ IF i.
Under the notation of subsection 3.2 we can also express the estimator as,
ŜCRi = 1S ∑
S
s=1 NPV (εs)− 1S ∑Ss=1 NPVi(εns), with ns ∈ N for all s ∈ J1;SK, or,
ŜCRi = 1S ∑
S
s=1 (NPV (εs)−NPVi(εns)).
In practice we want to underline here the importance to conserve the same simulation seed in both
the economic scenarios used to asses the standard V IF and those used to assess the shocked V IF . One
therefore has (denoting by s.s when using the same simulation seed in our estimations, be it of OF , V IF ,
full standard formula or marginal SCR),
ŜCR
s.s
i =
1
S ∑
S
s=1 (NPV (εs)−NPVi(εs)).
This point is of great importance because one generally verify that CoVar [NPV (ε);NPVi(ε)]> 0 so
that,
V
[
ŜCR
s.s
i
]
= 1SV [NPV (ε)−NPVi(ε)]= 1S (V [NPV (ε)]+V [NPVi(ε)])− 2SCoVar[NPV (ε);NPVi(ε)]
≤ 1S (V [NPV (ε)]+V [NPVi(ε)]) = V
[
ŜCRi
]
.
This upper bound is generally satisfied in practice. We have here tested this point on a standard
life insurance savings product, on a marginally shocked SCR, based on 2,500 economic scenarios, with
results displayed in Table 2 (denoting by ρ the empirical correlation between the central and shocked
NPV ),
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Table 2: Comparison between the approximated marginal SCR values - same seed vs. different seeds
with 95% confidence intervals
Spread SCR Central V IF Shocked V IF Marginal SCR ρ
Different seeds 11,289 (± 369) -441 (± 408) 11,730 (± 553) ρ =−0.7%
Same seed 11,289 (± 369) -448 (± 416) 11,737 (± 142) ρ = 94.2%
Stock SCR Central V IF Shocked V IF Marginal SCR ρ
Different seeds 11,289 (± 369) 3,789 (± 377) 7,500 (± 525) ρ = 1.0%
Same seed 11,289 (± 369) 3,831 (± 382) 7,458 (± 104) ρ = 96.3%
Real estate SCR Central V IF Shocked V IF Marginal SCR ρ
Different seed 11,289 (± 369) 8,724 (± 360) 2,565 (± 512) ρ = 1.4%
Same seed 11,289 (± 369) 8,618 (± 376) 2,671 (± 54) ρ = 98.9%
The results show a direct application of the previous inequality. Whichever the shocked SCR, the Dif-
ferent seeds estimated SCR converges much slower than the Same seed estimated SCR (not the estimated
V IF whose confidence intervals don’t evolve). In particular, concerning the spread SCR, we obtain a
decrease of the half-confidence interval by, at least, a coefficient 553142 ≈ 3.9. If a different seed had been
used, this means the number of scenarios that should have been used to evaluate the marginal SCR with
the same efficiency would have been close to 2500×3.92 = 38025.
This empirically justifies the use of the same seed, when estimating standard and shocked V IF ,
as a marginal SCR estimator variance reduction. Finally we assume the elliptically aggregated SCR
convergence increases (we verify it empirically in Appendix 1).
4 Implementation - a control variate specific application to increase the
V IF convergence speed
In this Section we present a relatively easy application of the methods from Section 3 using both variance
reduction methods presented and the seed conservation impact to increase even more the V IF estimators
convergence speed.
4.1 Implementation context and formalisation
All our work has been ignited by the empirical analysis of various ALM models. From a simplistic
point of view, ALM models are complex accumulations of accounting functions with entity specific
parameters (contract parameters, loading factors,...) and inputs (assets, liability model points,...). Both
are regularly updated but embed a strong inertia due to various factors (including long-term contracts,
top-management choices and long-term objectives,...).
Finally the way ALM models behave to an economic scenario random vector ε stays rather similar,
whichever initial economic conditions and calibration data are chosen by the modelling team. At least
on a limited time-lapse.
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Still using the seed-keeping character, leading to correlated central NPV and shocked NPVi, we have
tried to estimate the correlation of NPVα(ε) and of NPVβ (ε), with NPVα and NPVβ two different NPV
variables associated to two different economic conditions (namely situations α and β ).
The proposed methodology is simply to use NPVα (and the true value of E [NPVα ], denoted by V IFα
below), as a control variate for any other V IF one wants to estimate, here denoted as V IFβ (estimated on
NPVβ outcomes).
The main issue here is to assess an efficient estimation of V IFα . This is why we only implement it
one time though we test it on several different V IFβ economic situations.
In the implementations below we have chosen to estimate this V IFα value using 50,000 economic
scenarios so that the convergence of our estimator is good enough to be very close to the true V IFα . We
abusively identify this estimator to the true V IFα below (see subsection 4.3 for a more precise develop-
ment on the implications of the imperfect equality between this estimator and the true V IFα value).
This V IFα is estimated based on the end-of-year 2017 regulatory-consistent economic conditions
for all simulated economic quantity but nominal rates. Concerning nominal rates, we have used as
the reference (calibration/simulation) yield curve the market Euroswap rates (not the regulatory EIOPA
yield curve, used in Implementation 1 for the V IFβ situation), and the calibration swaption IV matrix is
the averaged 10 (maturities) x 10 (tenors) December 2017 matrix (not the standard end-of-year matrix,
also used in Implementation 1 for the V IFβ situation). This allows us to test very different economic
conditions for V IFβ . We assume any other economic situation chosen as our reference V IFα ’s should
have led to similar results6, we have simply chosen one in all generality.
We obtain for 50,000 scenarios, using AV, and with a randomly chosen simulation seed,7
V IFα = E [NPVα ]≈ Ê [NPVα ] = 22,005±765.
4.2 Implementation of control variate using V IFα
Recall subsection 3.2.2 concerning control variate implementation. We want to improve the convergence
of an estimator V̂ IFβ = 1S ∑
S
s=1 NPVβ (εs) using a control variate, here NPVα outcomes, assumed well
correlated with the NPVβ (εs)s∈J1;SK, and knowing E [NPVα ] =V IFα (see 4.1 for more details).
Indeed, if we already know V IFα quite well, we also need NPVα and NPVβ correlated (the most
possible) outcomes. In the implementations below we therefore always consider the same simulation
seed to search for a strong correlation between our NPVα and NPVβ outcomes. Basically this means we
have to assess couples
(
NPVα(εs),NPVβ (εs)
)
s∈J1;SK. In addition we want to stay operationally realistic,
with S low enough to be implementable. We have therefore chosen below S = 2,000 scenarios using
antithetic variables.
We obtain for 2,000 scenarios, using AV, and with our fixed simulation seed,
6The estimation actually depends on the choice of the reference date but the numerical evidence displayed in the article are
here to illustrate the effect without any objective of exhaustivity rather than a thorough study of the reference date choice.
7Note that in this section we focus on recent yield curves including negative interest rates. For this reason we use a Displaced
Diffusion Libor Market Model (see in particular Joshi & Rebonato (2003)) to model interest rates and calibrate these models
on normal/Bachelier swaptions IV (see e.g. Hohmann et al. (2015)). These choices are realistic considering current actuarial
practices.
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V̂ IFα = 12,000 ∑
2,000
s=1 NPVα(ε
s) = 23,949±3,666.
4.2.1 Implementation 1: V IFα economic situation vs. the standard regulatory economic condi-
tions as of end-of year 2017
In this first implementation we use the full standard end-of-year 2017 regulatory-consistent conditions
for the V IFβ economic situation. We therefore try to assess the true regulatory V IF of our savings
product as of end-of-year 2017. Compared to our V IFα situation, we therefore change the calibration
swaption IV matrix, using the end-of-year 10x10 matrix, and we use the corresponding RFR to calibrate
and simulate the 2,000 economic scenarios associated with the (εs)s∈J1;2,000K.
We obtain,
V̂ IFβ = 12,000 ∑
2,000
s=1 NPVβ (ε
s) = 20,615±3904.
As expected, based on the couples
(
NPVα(εs),NPVβ (εs)
)
s∈J1;2,000K, we estimate,
Ĉorrel[NPVα(ε),NPVβ (ε)] = 96.9%.
We have also,
cˆ∗ =−ĈoVar[NPVα (ε);NPVβ (ε)]Vˆ[NPVα (ε)] =−1.03.
And eventually,
V̂ IF
CV
β =
1
2,000 ∑
2,000
s=1
(
NPVβ (εs)+ cˆ∗ (NPVα(εs)−V IFα)
)
= 18,609±961.
We obtain a decrease of the half-confidence interval by a coefficient 3,904961 ≈ 4.1. This means without
using the CV such efficient estimation would have required close to 2,000×4.12 = 33,620 scenarios.
4.2.2 Implementation 2: V IFα economic situation vs. an updated El Karoui et al. (2017) calibra-
tion approach
In this second implementation we consider for V IFβ the situation tested and favoured in El Karoui et al.
(2017) but adapted to end-of-year 2017. Compared to our V IFα situation, we change the calibration
swaption IV matrix and use the averaged October-November 2017 v2 matrix (see subsection 1.3), and
we use the RFR to calibrate and simulate the 2,000 economic scenarios associated with the (εs)s∈J1;2,000K.
We obtain,
V̂ IFβ = 12,000 ∑
2,000
s=1 NPVβ (ε
s) = 11,354±4,336.
As expected, based on the couples
(
NPVα(εs),NPVβ (εs)
)
s∈J1;2,000K, we estimate,
Ĉorrel[NPVα(ε),NPVβ (ε)] = 92.9%.
We have also,
cˆ∗ =−ĈoVar[NPVα (ε);NPVβ (ε)]Vˆ[NPVα (ε)] =−1.10.
And eventually,
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V̂ IF
CV
β =
1
2,000 ∑
2,000
s=1
(
NPVβ (εs)+ cˆ∗ (NPVα(εs)−V IFα)
)
= 9,219±1,602.
We obtain a decrease of the half-confidence interval by a coefficient 4,3361,602 ≈ 2.7. This means without
using the CV such efficient estimation would have required close to 2,000×2.72 = 14,580 scenarios.
4.2.3 Implementation 3: V IFα economic situation vs. the regulatory conditions as of end of June
(mid year) 2018
In this third implementation we use the full standard end of June 2018 regulatory conditions for the V IFβ
economic situation. We therefore try to assess the true regulatory V IF of our savings product as of end
of June 2018. Compared to our V IFα situation, we therefore change the calibration swaption IV matrix,
using the end of June 2018 10x10 matrix, and we use the corresponding RFR to calibrate and simulate
the 2,000 economic scenarios associated with the (εs)s∈J1;2,000K.
We obtain,
V̂ IFβ = 12,000 ∑
2,000
s=1 NPVβ (ε
s) = 38,470±3,667.
As expected, based on the couples
(
NPVα(εs),NPVβ (εs)
)
s∈J1;2,000K, we estimate,
Ĉorrel[NPVα(ε),NPVβ (ε)] = 91.9%.
We have also,
cˆ∗ =−ĈoVar[NPVα (ε);NPVβ (ε)]Vˆ[NPVα (ε)] =−0.92.
And eventually,
V̂ IF
CV
β =
1
2,000 ∑
2,000
s=1
(
NPVβ (εs)+ cˆ∗ (NPVα(εs)−V IFα)
)
= 36,682±1,447.
We obtain a decrease of the half-confidence interval by a coefficient 3,6671,447 ≈ 2.5. This means without
using the CV such efficient estimation would have required close to 2,000×2.52 = 12,500 scenarios.
4.3 Final analyse based on our implementations results
The methodology presented and implemented in Section 4 may seem practically delicate to use but, as
aforementioned, its unique complexity lies in the very precise estimation of one V IF (denoted by V IFα
above, estimated by 50,000 scenarios here)8. Then, using control variate enables to take profit of the
convergence knowledge assessed from this heavy estimation and improve any other V IFβ valuation, as
soon as the economic situation under which this valuation is made is not too far (in time and in space)
from the V IFα situation.
Through our different implementations we have obtained, with our implementation choices, a re-
8Concerning the NPVα outcomes required to build the control variate part of the NPVCVβ (cˆ
∗
(
NPVα (εs)−V̂ IFα
)
) it seems
also possible to use the same seed when estimating precisely V IFα as when estimating roughly (without using CV) V IFβ so
that the NPVα outcomes are already calculated when estimating the precise V IFα estimation and they do not need additional
complexity.
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duction of the estimators variance equivalent to using between 6 and 20× more economic scenarios.
However one must note that this great improvement is also associated to the integration of a relatively
small bias to the valuation linked to the fact that the true V IFα is not known in reality, we have simply
an (good) estimation V˜ IFα = 150,000 ∑
50,000
s=1 NPVα(ε
vs) for some vs ∈ N, ∀s ∈ J1;50,000K.9 Finally,
E
[
V̂ IF
CV
β
]
= E
[
NPVCVβ (ε)
]
= E
[
NPVβ (ε)+ cˆ∗
(
NPVα(ε)−V˜ IFα
)]
=V IFβ + cˆ∗
(
V IFα −V˜ IFα
)
.
The final bias of V̂ IF
CV
β is therefore cˆ
∗
(
V IFα −V˜ IFα
)
. This bias is small and would be null if the
estimator V˜ IFα had converged. To reduce this bias it is therefore ideal to use the highest possible number
of economic scenarios when estimating the true V IFα value. We consider the convergence improvement
as relevant enough to prevail this small bias that can be controlled.
Basically, the underlying idea of this methodology is to obtain a footprint of the ALM model and
its behaviour, at one moment in time. Then using this knowledge, the user knows how to adjust future
ALM valuations. Under this comparison, it seems a priori necessary to keep the same ALM model.
This is indeed ideal but in practice most ALM models behave similarly to similar economic scenarios.
This means any two models would actually display grossly the same variations even if those are not
exactly one-to-one. For example, when stock indexes rise the NPV rises, whichever ALM model is
considered. It is impossible to generalise it to full scenarios that include stock indexes, interest rates
(nominal/real/risky),... But we can assume a change in ALM model between the V IFα and V IFβ may
conserve Correl(NPVα(ε),NPVβ (ε))> 0.
Finally, we recall this approach would only lead to efficient results when regularly updated. Once
again, the ALM model footprint is highly dependent on its underlying model points, Asset-Liability
transition parameters and on many other points. We highly recommend, for the sake of efficiency, to
update it at least yearly.
Conclusion
In this paper we have focused on the necessity to stabilise the European life insurance regulation valuation
scheme based on the so-called concept of market-consistency. We have underlined the insurance-specific
interpretation of this concept which originally tends to link the scheme to market finance practices and
theory.
In section 1, we motivated the construction of the whole Solvency II Directive in its objective of
enforcing financial stability or harmonising accounting norms to increase both transparency and financial
resilience and as a consequence consumer protection. However, by doing so, different elements such as
the Risk Free Rate or items from the Long term guarantee package - e.g. the volatility adjustment -
have material consequences on the levels of the interest rate curve and as outlined in El Karoui et al.
(2017) intrinsically contradicts the goal of market-consistency as far as the market prices and technical
9It seems possible to use vs = s,∀s ∈ J1;50,000K (same seed) in particular when the number of simulations (50,000 here) is
high enough.
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provisions best estimates are concerned.
In particular we have presented, through Section 2, some practical reasons why the no-arbitrage op-
portunity condition can never be respected through insurance valuation. This aspect is only theoretical
and does not question the practical regulation implementation framework. We wanted here to further
investigate the mathematical background, especially regarding the actual interest of the averaging ap-
proach introduced by El Karoui et al. (2017), in order to introduce stability in the calibration data used
by practitioners, but also in reducing the manipulability of the valuation scheme.
In Sections 3 and 4 we have then addressed a second aspect of major importance in the stability of
the considered valuation. We have proposed different approaches to improve the Solvency II Monte-
Carlo estimators convergence by working on the simulation seeds and on the use of variance reduction
techniques. Finally, in our implementations we have reduced the variance of our V IF estimators by more
than 16× (but integrating a small - manageable - bias in estimation, see subsection 4.2 and 4.3) and the
marginal (standard formula) SCR by up to more than 15× (in subsection 3.3). Note that these results
have been obtained on a single ALM life insurance model and future investigations will be necessary to
efficiently generalize this analysis.
Though we consider the simulation seed issue we must recall to practitioners the only question that
must be addressed here is convergence. Indeed, though it is probable that for a given model there exist
some seeds leading to estimations closer to their true value than others, it cannot be generalised that
one specific seed is better than another. Therefore we do not address the seed choice problem but only
promote the choice of the same simulation seeds for each calculations, to valuate standard formula SCR,
use the control variate method presented in Section 4 but also to respect some stability in estimation bias
and improve the comparability through time of economic valuations.
In future works we will test our methods on further ALM models and economic situations. We also
intend to address deeper the similar simulation seed implications on valuation, propose a complete update
of the El Karoui et al. (2017) approach and test further sensitivities on economic valuations. Would those
techniques be used on an industrial scale with all robustness checks being made, this would highlight and
enhance the feasibility of forward looking analyses such as ORSA (or other type of estimations from the
Pillar 2) which are highly time-consuming and resource-demanding.
Appendix 1 - impact of using similar simulation seed on aggregated SCR
Let us now consider 2 different marginal SCR, for risks i and j ∈ (riskα , ...,riskI) and denote by ρi, j
the elliptic aggregation correlation (users often choose the regulatory specifications which provide these
correlations, see in particular European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (2010)) between
SCRi and SCR j. We consider below,
SCRi, j =
√
SCR2i +SCR
2
j +2ρi, jSCRiSCR j.
10
We aim at comparing V
[
ŜCR
s.s
i, j
]
and the standard V
[
ŜCRi, j
]
.
10Basically the aggregated SCR is obtained by SCR =
√
∑i, j∈(risk1,...,riskI) ρi, jSCRiSCR j with ρi, j = 1 when i = j.
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V
[
ŜCRi, j
]
= V
[√
ŜCR
2
i + ŜCR
2
j +2ρi, jŜCRiŜCR j
]
= E
[
ŜCR
2
i + ŜCR
2
j +2ρi, jŜCRiŜCR j
]
−SCR2i, j
= V
[
ŜCRi
]
+V
[
ŜCR j
]
+2ρi, jE
[
ŜCRiŜCR j
]
+SCR2i +SCR
2
j −SCR2i, j.
We can easily assume, from the work above,V
[
ŜCR
s.s
i
]
≤ V
[
ŜCRi
]
,
V
[
ŜCR
s.s
j
]
≤ V
[
ŜCR j
]
.
Concerning the +2ρi, jE
[
ŜCRiŜCR j
]
part it is complex to estimate a general comparison with the
optimised +2ρi, jE
[
ŜCR
s.s
i ŜCR
s.s
j
]
. We can assume ρi, j ≥ 0 (true for most regulatory correlation factors)
but it is probable that the comparability of both expressions depends on risks i and j... If ρi, j = 0 it is
clear that V
[
ŜCR
s.s
i, j
]
≤V
[
ŜCRi, j
]
. In any case we assume the efficiency of keeping the same simulation
seed to reduce the variances should also lead to V
[
ŜCR
s.s
i, j
]
≤ V
[
ŜCRi, j
]
.
We have tested several ρi, j > 0 values and several couples of risks i and j with following results
obtained using bootstrap estimators assessed on 2,500 aggregated SCR outcomes, each one estimated
on 2,500 standard bootstrapped - sampled with replacement (see e.g. Efron & Tibshirani (1997)) -
outcomes among 2,500 i.i.d. outcomes NV P−NPVi. Using standard bootstrap it is possible to assess
specific confidence intervals: CIbootstrapα%
(
ŜCR
)
=
[
2Eˆ
[
ŜCR
]
−q 1+α
2
(
ŜCR
)
;2Eˆ
[
ŜCR
]
−q 1−α
2
(
ŜCR
)]
The results are given in Table 3.
Table 3: Comparison between the approximated 2-risks aggregated SCR values - Same seed vs. Different
seeds with 95% confidence interval
Spread/stock SCR ρi, j = 0.25 ρi, j = 0.5 ρi, j = 0.75
Different seeds 15,427 [14,482;16,032] 16,793 [15,766;17,460] 18,055 [16,936;18,778]
Same seed 15,398 [15,184;15,545] 16,759 [16,525;16,920] 18,017 [17,765;18,180]
Spread/RE SCR ρi, j = 0.25 ρi, j = 0.5 ρi, j = 0.75
Different seeds 12,617 [11,746;13,180] 13,198 [12,234;13,820] 13,755 [12,689;14,455]
Same seed 12,673 [12,472;12,799] 13,277 [13,066;13,411] 13,855 [13,635;13,997]
RE/stock SCR ρi, j = 0.25 ρi, j = 0.5 ρi, j = 0.75
Different seeds 8,507 [7,628;9,053] 9,053 [8,089;9,668] 9,567 [8,526;10,252]
Same seed 8,526 [8,364;8,625] 9,091 [8,910;9,198] 9,623 [9,438;9,736]
Finally the use of the same simulation seed seems to work very well on the 2-risks aggregated SCR
but also on the 3-risks aggregated SCR we tested (see Table 4).
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Table 4: Comparison between the approximated RE/stock/spread risks aggregated SCR values - same
seed vs. different seeds with 95% confidence interval
3-risks SCR ρi, j = ρi,k = ρ j,k = 0.25 ρi, j = ρi,k = ρ j,k = 0.5 ρi, j = ρi,k = ρ j,k = 0.75
Different seeds 16,400 [15,249;17,142] 18,371 [17,019;19,241] 20,150 [18,603;21,146]
Same seed 16,426 [16,168;16,582] 18,417 [18,126;18,591] 20,213 [19,891;20,405]
Appendix 2 - concerning solvency ratios
We have proposed above different approaches to both reduce the variance of the OF/V IF and the SCR.
Now we also address the solvency ratio (SR = OFSCR or using our both approaches and implicit notations,
SRCV = OF
CV
SCRCV,s.s ) issue. This ratio is in many ways the most important quantity used by practitioners and
control authorities to evaluate and compare solvency among companies.As aforementioned, the variance
of the OF is basically the one of the V IF (OF = RNA+V IF and the RNA is deterministic).
First, it appears natural to couple the approach on V IF (CV) and the one on SCR (s.s) while es-
timating, so that the user can obtain optimised estimators. Then, we still consider situation β as the
valuation time economic situation, so that we use notation β below (NPVβ /NPVCVβ , NPVβ ,i/NPV
CV,s.s
β ,i ,
V IFβ /V IFCVβ , V IFβ ,i/V IF
CV,s.s
β ,i , OFβ /OF
CV
β , OFβ ,i/OF
CV,s.s
β ,i , SCRβ /SCR
CV,s.s
β , SCRβ ,i/SCR
CV,s.s
β ,i , and more
simply SRβ /SRCVβ ). Finally, we can define our optimal estimator, for each marginal risk i SCR,
ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i = ÔF
CV
β − ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
(
= V̂ IF
CV
β −V̂ IF
CV,s.s
β ,i
)
In all generality it seems very difficult to theoretically prove our full-optimised estimator ŜR
CV
β =
ÔF
CV
β
ŜCR
CV,s.s
β
converges faster than the standard ŜRβ =
ÔFβ
ŜCRβ
. However, we have obtained some first results
considering a marginal SCR as the solvency ratio denominator. This leads to a simpler/marginal sol-
vency ratio SRβ ,i =
OFβ
SCRβ ,i
(still considering risk i). We now compare the variances of an optimised(
ŜR
CV
β ,i =
ÔF
CV
β
ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
)
and a standard
(
ŜRβ ,i =
ÔFβ
ŜCRβ ,i
)
estimator.
Note first the three following points11,
11We assume below, for the sake of simplicity, the aforementioned bias (see 4.3) impact is negligible.
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
1)V
[
ÔF
CV
β
]
= V
[
V̂ IF
CV
β
]
= 1SV
[
NPVβ (ε)+ c∗ (NPVα(ε)−E [V IFα(ε)])
]
= 1S
(
V
[
NPVβ (ε)
]
+ c∗V [NPVα(ε)]+2c∗.CoVar
[
NPVα(ε);NPVβ (ε)
])
=O
( 1
S
)
,
2)V
[
ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
= 1SV
[
NPVCVβ (ε)−NPVCV,s.sβ ,i (ε)
]
= O
( 1
S
)
, and,
3)CoVar
[
ÔF
CV
β ; ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
=CoVar
[
V̂ IF
CV
β ; ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
=CoVar
[
1
S ∑
S
s=1 NPV
CV
β (ε
s); 1S ∑
S
s=1 NPV
CV
β (ε
s)− 1S ∑Ss=1 NPVCV,s.sβ ,i (εs)
]
= 1SV
[
NPVCVβ (ε)
]
−CoVar
[
1
S ∑
S
s=1 NPV
CV
β (ε
s); 1S ∑
S
s=1 NPV
CV,s.s
β ,i (ε
s)
]
= 1SV
[
NPVCVβ (ε)
]
− 1SCoVar
[
NPVCVβ (ε);NPV
CV,s.s
β ,i (ε)
]
so that,
CoVar
[
ÔF
CV
β ; ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
=O
( 1
S
)
.
We can then use the well-known asymptotic delta-method approximation (see Stuart & Ord (1994),
Elandt et al. (1980)) for the variance of our marginal solvency ratio,
V
[
ŜR
CV
β ,i
]
= V
[
ÔF
CV
β
ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
= V
[
ÔF
CV
β
ÔF
CV
β −ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
= V
[
ÔF
CV
β −ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i +ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
ÔF
CV
β −ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
= V
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
ÔF
CV
β −ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
≈ 1SCR2β ,iV
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
+
OF2β ,i
SCR3β ,i
V
[
ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
−2 OFβ ,i
SCR3β ,i
CoVar
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i ; ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
= 1SCR2β ,i
V
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
+
OF2β ,i
SCR3β ,i
V
[
ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
−2 OFβ ,i
SCR3β ,i
CoVar
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i ; ÔF
CV
β − ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
With in particular,
CoVar
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i ; ÔF
CV
β − ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
=CoVar
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i ; ÔF
CV
β
]
−V
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
so that,
V
[
ŜR
CV
β ,i
]
≈
(
1
SCR2β ,i
+2 OFβ ,i
SCR3β ,i
)
V
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
+
OF2β ,i
SCR3β ,i
V
[
ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
−2 OFβ ,i
SCR3β ,i
CoVar
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i ; ÔF
CV
β
]
.
Let us now assume (weak assumptions, from our work),
V
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
≤ V
[
ÔFβ ,i
]
,
V
[
ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
≤ V
[
ŜCRβ ,i
]
,
CoVar
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i ; ÔF
CV
β
]
≥CoVar
[
ÔFβ ,i; ÔFβ
]
.
In particular, CoVar
[
ÔF
CV
β ,i ; ÔF
CV
β
]
≈ 012. We therefore obtain,(
1
SCR2β ,i
+2 OFβ ,i
SCR3β ,i
)
V
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
+
OF2β ,i
SCR3β ,i
V
[
ŜCR
CV,s.s
β ,i
]
−2 OFβ ,i
SCR3β ,i
CoVar
[
ÔF
CV,s.s
β ,i ; ÔF
CV
β
]
12The standard and shocked OF estimators being estimated using different simulation seed/economic scenarios, the respec-
tive NPV are independent and so is their average.
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≤
(
1
SCR2β ,i
+2 OFβ ,i
SCR3β ,i
)
V
[
ÔFβ ,i
]
+
OF2β ,i
SCR3β ,i
V
[
ŜCRβ ,i
]
−2 OFβ ,i
SCR3β ,i
CoVar
[
ÔFβ ,i; ÔFβ
]
.13
We can finally assume (up to our delta method approximations and other weak assumptions) that,
with our CV approach we are supposed to decrease the marginal solvency ratio estimator variance,
V
[
ŜR
CV
β ,i
]
≤ V
[
ŜRβ ,i
]
.
Further developments (including at least empirical tests) will be required to better qualify our method
impact on the solvency ratios precision.
13The approximation obtained using the delta method on ŜRβ ,i.
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